Concorde's Fate in the Troposphere

Concorde’s Fate in the Troposphere: a Brief Analysis of the Rise and Fall of World’s Fastest Commercial Jet

Majestic Concorde:

Concorde is one of the most recognizable airplanes in the world. It was the fastest and the highest-flying commercial jet in history. It flew at over two times the speed of sound (2,179km/h or 1,354mp/h). It was an absolute marvel of collaboration, innovation, and technology, and yet, in 2003, after only having a total of 14 planes ever to fly commercially, it was permanently retired. With only one short-lived exception– the Soviet Tu-144– the Concorde was the only commercial aircraft to ever maintain a cruising speed higher than the sound barrier. So, why did it fail?

Introduction:

           

The 1940s to the 1970s ushered in a new era of commercial aviation growth as the Second World War came to an end, which led a safer and more comfortable economic space in which to operate. In that time, what is often called the Jet Age emerged. The here, the turbofan engine started appearing on such notable aircraft as the Boeing 707, giving rise to an unprecedented form of transport that could foreseeably become a widely accessible transport system, particularly on such long journeys as trans-Atlantic routes.

Boeing 707

Europe and America was starting to become connected in a way that very few people had previously experienced. The safety and reliability of these new engines allowed airplanes to soar to new heights, with more passenger and cargo capacity, and could travel new distances, in less time, for less cost as compared to an ocean liner (Boeing, 2015, para. 6).

The dramatic increase in speed and efficiency, coupled with the relatively new concept of flying faster than the speed of sound engineers quickly began searching for a way to maximally shorten travel times, particularly on common long-haul routes such as from London to New York. The ambition to flying for prolonged periods of time at speeds exceeding the speed of sound –approximately 1,225 km/h, also known as Mach 1– posed many difficult challenges for engineers as the conventional shape of an airplane was built for generating lift, not maximizing speed. These challenges were not seen as limitations, but rather considered to be obstacles for engineers to overcome, and given the prospect that the first company to figure out how to overcome them could dominate this sector, aggressive and expensive supersonic transport (SST) projects were launched in the USA, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Ultimately only one project prevailed: Concorde, built by Aérospatiale-BAC, which was a joint project between French and British teams.

This project will address the many physical challenges that faced SSTs, and will examine the competitive atmosphere in which the SST projects were conceived. We will then attempt to explain why the Concorde project, one of the most expensive and safest commercial aviation projects ever conceived, ultimately failed.

The Faster You Try to Go, the Harder Mother Nature Tries to Hold You Back:

           

In order to properly understand the demise of the Concorde, one must have at least a superficial appreciation as to why an SST project is so ambitious and difficult to develop.

1. Lift vs. Drag: in the 1960s it was already understood that there are two major factors that affect the aerodynamics of an airplane, namely lift and drag. The shape of a wing is very important in the how the airplane flies. The longer the wingspan, the more area, and thus the more lift (ability to fly) a wing can generate, but this is exchanged for the fact that a longer wing has more leading edge, meaning that there is more parts of the wing ‘hitting’ the air. The problem with this design is that the leading edge causes drag (air resistance), thus requiring more power to overcome it. So, a solution to this challenge is the Delta wing, which reduces leading edge, and instead increases surface area by making the wing longer along the fuselage of the airplane. (photo of delta wing) This design allows for significantly faster flight due to less drag, but it also requires significantly faster speeds, thus more power, in order to stay airborne because it does not generate as much lift as the first design (Hirschberg, 1997, p.1-6).

   

   Concorde as compared to the Boeing 2707. Notice the totally different wings (Hirschberg, 1997, p.2-2).

2. Sound Barrier: Sound travels through air. The speed of sound is a physical phenomenon that is affected by the way that air molecules move. When an object moves through air slower than the speed of sound, the air can bounce off of the object and essentially gets out of the way. But when this object is travelling faster than Mach 1 the air cannot bounce away fast enough, thus forming a sort of invisible wall of air. In order to overcome this resistance, the airplane requires a significant amount of extra thrust as compared to an airplane flying slightly below Mach speed.
3. Sonic Boom: Traveling at faster than the speed of sound also creates what is described as a sonic boom, which is generally by observers as either a physical rumble or a the loud shockwave of an explosion. The sonic boom created by Concorde could be felt and heard on the ground below the plane.

These three limitations are important in understanding why the Concorde was ultimately not feasible in the airline industry.

Industry Analysis of 2003: PEST

Political: French and British companies, Aérospatiale and the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC), jointly created Concorde in the 1960s-70s under an international political treaty that prevented either company country from abandoning the project. This project would foreseeably be extraordinarily expensive, but it was considered necessary in order for the countries to remain at the forefront of civil aviation, particularly with regards to the Americans and the Soviets (Johnman & Francis, 2002). Concorde entered service in 1976 and remained a symbol of innovation and prestige that was closely linked to the founding countries. The aircraft was retired in 2003. At that time, Richard Branson, CEO of Virgin Atlantic Airways attempted to revive the Concorde by purchasing the entire British Airways fleet. Due to the concerns that future legal issues could arise for Airbus, British Airways, and the UK government if the airplane continued flying, Branson’s offer was rejected and Airbus discontinued any maintenance services for the aircraft.

Economic: A decline in economic activity in the early 2000s caused many countries to curtail their civil expenditures. Meanwhile, conflicts were arising in the Middle East that were also projected to cost a tremendous amount of money caused some governments to redirect their spending focuses. This economic climate affected many developed countries, sending many into economic recessions, which in turn affected civil consumption of luxury products like travel on board the Concorde.

Social: On 5 July 2000, Concorde suffered its first and only fatal crash soon after it left Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France. All on board, plus four on the ground, were killed in the accident. Due to the perceived aging of the aircraft being associated with the crash, and a fall in airline travel after the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York, Concorde’s passenger numbers began to fall and remained at unsustainable levels for the remainder of the aircraft’s operational life. Furthermore, public concern over greenhouse gas emissions was increasing, meaning that grossly inefficient transport vehicles were inevitably going to decline in popularity.

Technological: Concorde ran on four low-bypass– inefficient– turbofan engines (contrasted against the high-bypass engines of most other airplanes) that required afterburners to be engaged for a prolonged period of time in order to reach the desired cruising speed. This combination meant that the Concorde burned fuel at a significantly higher speed than other trans-Atlantic planes, while carrying only one quarter of the passengers of the popular Boeing 747. These characteristics were required in order to overcome the physical barriers described above. In this sense, the Concorde simply could not compete with other modern airliners in terms of fuel efficiency.

Competitive Analysis: Porter’s 5-Forces

Threat of new entrants

The threat of new entrants was very weak. The aviation industry required huge capital investment to enter, which made the barriers to entry extremely high. Government support was a necessary factor for entering into this industry, particularly in the SST category. The US government supported Boeing, while the French, German, Spanish and English governments founded Airbus. Concorde, they entered service in 1976 while they started researching and developing their supersonic passenger airliner in the 1950s. During this period, the British and French government injected huge capital into the project. In addition, as the safely issue was the main concern for the aviation industry, the sophisticated technological knowledge and expertise were required to develop the airliner.

Threat of substitute products or services

The threat of substitute products or services was high. The potential substitute products for airliner were train, car, boats, or subsonic, long haul planes. For the short and regional flight, people may choose these substitute products. For the long and international routes, particularly between the Americas and Europe, the threat of these substitutes was nearly eliminated as distances were simply too great to allow convenient non-air travel. However, the threat of substitutes such, as subsonic airlines, increased dramatically as more and more entered service in the 1970s, including the Boeing 747.

Bargaining power of customers (buyers)

At the beginning of the Concorde project, customers had relatively weak bargaining power. Only a few companies dominated the aviation industry the 1950s-60s. It was difficult for the airline companies to choose the alternative airliner brands. Also, buyers were not price sensitive as their choices were few. Moreover, the costs were very high for the companies that were already operating the Concorde to switch. For example, they need to hire the new maintenance staff and pilot as the construction of the airliner was different.

Bargaining power of suppliers

The bargaining power of suppliers was medium. The development of passenger airliner required extremely high-tech capacities. Requirement for the parts and equipment were also very high. For example, the engine, the avionics, and hybrid circuits were all specialty items, meaning that the suppliers had increased bargaining power due to a lack of competition. However, what lowered the suppliers’ bargaining power was that the aviation industry was dominated by few companies, meaning that parts and equipment were very unique and had to be sold to these few companies.

Intensity of competitive rivalry

The intensity of competitive rivalry was low. The commercial aviation industry was not yet matured during the Concorde’s development period. Although there were other SST projects being created in the United States (Boeing 2707) and in the USSR (Tupolev Tu-144), neither project was anywhere near as successful as the Concorde. The 2707 was terminated before production and the TU-144 had limited routes and only few 55 schedule passenger flights.

Boeing 2707

Tupolev Tu-144

After doing the industry analysis, Concorde might estimate that the aviation industry was not in an intense competition and they could gain a lot once the supersonic passenger airliner could be successfully developed by them. In order to forecast new

technology adoption, we can apply the theory from Lawrence K Vanston. He stated

that the drivers and constraints could be used to assess new technology adoption.

For the drivers, Concorde’s airliner could provide high satisfaction for their

passenger. For example, passenger could save half time if they travel by supersonic

passenger airliner instead of other airliners. For the constraints, the research and the

manufacture for supersonic passenger airliner cost too much. Concorde needed to

consider whether the cost could be decrease or not. If not, it is difficult for them to

make profit.

Everybody Wants It, but No One Will Buy:

            In the 1950s and 1960s, the commercial aviation industry was very young. Analysts were still unsure of what the trends would be for the future of air travel, but they seemed to be going up. In fact, starting in the 1960s, 17 separate airlines had placed orders for 75 aircraft with the hopes that the service provided by Concorde would keep them competitive in the growing market. But test after test ended up making it the most tested airplane ever (British Airways, 2015, para. 3). This, however, ended up being both its blessing and its. What the extensive testing of the airplane proved was that it was extremely reliable and showed that all of its performance promises were possible to keep. The downside to all the testing was that it became abundantly clear to prospective airlines that there were going to likely be some strict limitations put on the plane due to its abysmal fuel consumption and its very disruptive sonic boom. They all began to grow worried that carbon dioxide emissions into the high atmosphere, coupled with the audible and physical nuisances caused by the sonic boom. One by one, airlines started cancelling their orders and left all of the 14 commercial jets produced to be split evenly between British Airways and Air France.

What Went Wrong?:

            If we look around today, we can see that airline companies pop up all over the place. What we may notice even before we notice those that are appearing is those that are disappearing. The civil aviation industry is notoriously competitive, has very thin profit margins, and many companies often spend a significant amount of time running at a deficit. This has a lot to do with customers wanting to pay lower and lower prices while operating costs continue to climb, particularly with the price of fuel.

            Concorde customers, both regular and new, that were willing to pay the first-class ticket prices, were abundant for the operating life of the airplane until the famous crash in 2000.

Moments before Concorde's first and only crash

 Even at that time, cost was not the real issue for the passengers, but it was an increasingly burdensome cost on British Airways and Air France, as operating costs continued to climb. Furthermore, passengers paying the Concorde prices had the alternative of flying for the same prices in the airlines’ first-class services on their regular jetliners.

            In our view, the thing that was the most troubling for Concorde was never its image or the costs of doing business, but was rather the physical limitations posed on the plane by Mother Nature. Moving at over the speed of sound requires a tremendous amount of energy that had no prospects improving the foreseeable future. Since the Concorde started flying in the 1960s until now, the technology has not really improved. The basic logic is: if you want to go faster, you have to push harder. To push harder, you need more energy.

Fuel needed to get a rocket to space

 The emission emitted by the Concorde, along with its low seat and weight capacity, and its disproportionately high consumption of jet fuel as compared to other planes meant that Concorde was not a technology that engineers could improve upon.

            These limitations were likely unforeseeable at the time of development as the engineers were not able to anticipate the innovations that would come. How could they have known that in 2015 there would still be no way to fly at those speeds, with that amount of weight, for that long, without burning a tremendous amount of fuel? To them, probably nothing seemed impossible. Consider that only about 50 years before they developed the Concorde, manned flight was an impossibility, and then during development, humans landed on the Moon and then safely returned to talk about it. As Robert C. Merton in the Harvard Business Review wants us to appreciate, there is always a risk when treading into new technological territories. There is no way to know how the technology will progress and how it will be used once you put it in the hands of public users (Merton, 2013). With airplane efficiencies trending downward since the 1960s, Concorde was simply not a product that could continue to do what it was doing without an inevitable fall in customers due to growing awareness about the connection between aircraft emissions and climate change.

Airplane efficiency trends

           

What Can We Learn?

            The Concorde was one of the most magnificent flying machines ever invented. It overcame every technological and physical barrier and showed the world what was possible. In the end, though, the technology failed. So what can we take away from this project? Perhaps the best thing that we can take away from it is that Mother Nature is an extremely powerful force. She grants no exceptions to anyone with regards to her rules. If you can’t compete by playing by her rules, you shouldn’t compete at all. We can always make things smaller or bigger; we find new and faster ways to acquire and store information; we can make buildings taller and elevators faster; what we can’t do is break Mother Nature’s rules. It is simply impossible.

            Air resistance, as an example, is something that we faced in the 1960s, and we face it today. It is one of the main contributors to why cars can’t go faster or drive further on a single tank of gas; it is why we have meteor showers at night; it is why parachutes work. Concorde’s designers couldn’t have foreseen that we wouldn’t have a sleeker way to deal with wind resistance today, but they could have known that it was always going to be there. If your innovation is not up to the challenge of playing by Mother Nature’s rules, your innovation is doomed to fail.

Reference

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